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In this essay human rights encounter Durkheim’s social — that sui generis beyond 
the sum of individuals. “The social” will here be seen as structure and culture. Like “the 
social”, the human rights were embedded in a structure with the state system up front, 
carrying an enlightenment culture, being a product of its context. The third human rights 
generation effort to accommodate peace, development and the environment inside a 
human rights discourse is problematic as these are social level constructs. The two pillars 
are shaking under globalization. The peace research discourse is an effort to elaborate 
epistemologies capable of accommodating such problems. A key term is “trans,” like in 
transnational, translevel, and transdisciplinary. Human rights as they emerged are not 
forever, nor is “the social.” Adapt or die, that is the choice.
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The Human Rights Pillars: The State System and the 
Enlightenment
In this essay human rights encounter Durkheim’s le social — that sui 
generis beyond the sum of individuals.
“The social” will here be seen as structure and culture. A structure is a 
web of social relations. We are in the structures as individual and collective 
actors, steered-guided by rewards-punishment to the extent of 
institutionalization. And a culture is the web of meaning, cultures are inside us 
as individual and collective actors, steered, guided by a sense of good and bad 
feelings, to the extent of internalization.
The human rights tradition carries the imprint of its origin in 17th-18th 
centuries European history: a state system officially born on the day of the 
Westphalia Treaty 24 October 1648, and the Enlightenment associated with 
early 18th century France, like with Voltaire and Rousseau. Migrating across 
the Atlantic it inspired the 1776 US Declaration of Independence and the 
1787 Constitution, then crossed the Atlantic again and inspired the 1789 
French constitution. From France to France.
The state system structures the rights and duties of states. One right is 
the right of war, and one duty is to declare the war in advance; the right that 
Japan was deprived of in Article 9 of its constitution. States are conceived of 
as sovereign, conditioned by nothing but themselves, like the construction of 
individuals in Western Antiquity and Western Modernity-Renaissance; 
actually in denial of the sui generis.1
The enlightenment is a secular culture removing the divine from its 
predecessor, christianity: from the economy (Adam Smith; but surviving as 
an invisible hand); from the human mind (Kant, but surviving as moral 
consciousness and the stars); from mechanics (Laplace, je n’ai pas besoin de 
cette hypothèse), from evolution (Darwin), from history (Marx), from 
individual moral struggle (Freud). Quite some project.
How, then, do the two socials and human rights interlink?
The human rights were embedded in a structure with the state system 
up front, carrying an enlightenment culture, being a product of its context. 
But precisely how?
As a triadic structure with an organization of states as norm-senders, the 
1 Like the famous Margaret Thatcher thesis that there is no such thing as society, only individuals; 
thereby in principle denying the basis of sociology as a science.
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states — as an organization with ultimate power inside a country — as norm-
receivers, and humans, or more precisely men and citizens, as norm-objects. 
In French, le droit de l’homme et du citoyen. In legal language this makes 
individuals the rights-holders, and states the duty-holders. The duty of the 
duty-holders is to see to it that the rights of the right-holders are met. Again, 
quite some project.
In this triadic structure the state organization gives legitimacy to states 
who receive the human rights norms by signing and ratifying, in return for 
states being accountable in human rights terms; and the states guarantee the 
rights of the individual citizens in return for such citizen duties as paying 
taxes, military service and respect for the state:
                     Organization of states
 
            legitimacy                    accountability       
 
                                                  states
 
                rights                     duties
 
                                             individuals
The norm content, their culture, reflected enlightenment secularism. Not 
only was the divine, as expressed in the Ten Commandments, removed as 
norm-sender, but also as a source of legitimacy and as the judge holding 
individuals accountable.2
Even non-divine spirituality, attachment to some reality beyond the sum 
of individuals — like the web of life (buddhist) or the togetherness in the 
divine (islam) or the membership in a clan or in social harmony (Chinese, 
Japanese) — is removed.3 The social comes as the naked individualism of the 
ubiquitous “everyone”, in short as an I-culture. Even the right of self-
determination is individualized to voting, not as a right bestowed on a we, a 
we-culture-structure, like the culture of the village as a habitat, of a traditional 
craft, of a clan.
The human rights culture is one of concreteness, a basic concern being 
2 Very problematic, indeed, for god-states like the USA, Israel and Iran, accountable to that higher 
authority only; in the case of the US a closely “under God” that there is hardly space for any UN 
Charter or International Bill of Human Rights in-between.
3 See Galtung and MacQueen (2008), see www.transcend.org/tup
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that the thesis “a human right has been/has not been met” can be verified, or 
at least falsified. There is an implicit behaviorism evident to any eye perusing 
the 12 December 1948 UD and the 16 December 1966 CP and ESC 
Covenants the first and second generations respectively. In principle rights-
holders have claims on duty-holders, and adjudication is based on holding 
the empirically observed and non-observed evidence up against the 
normatively defined right and wrong. The concrete and empirical will then 
tilt the rights away from the spiritual and mental toward the somatic and 
behavioral.
The third human rights generation effort to accommodate peace, 
development and the environment inside a human rights discourse is 
problematic as these are social level constructs. But Article 28 of the UD may 
come to the rescue, normalizing to everyone language: Everyone is entitled to 
a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in 
this Declaration can be fully realized.
Globalization Challenging the Pillars
The two-three centuries old context for the human rights tradition has 
in the meantime changed dramatically. Both pillars are shaking under the 
impact of globalization processes toward an increasingly borderless and an 
increasingly shrinking world. “Borderless” refers to the gradual erosion of the 
borders between states, and “shrinking” to all human categories, any other, 
coming closer, even so close that such borders as fault-lines, between genders 
and generations, classes and nations, are also either erased, or reinforced.
For eyes trained on territorial borders only it may look as if we are 
moving toward a one state-one nation world; the single state being the world, 
and the single nation humanity. In other words, a world government in a 
world without major fault-lines of any kind, only individuals, many, diverse, 
but borderless, and with the three generations of human rights as 
constitution.
Not so. The pillars are shaking under globalization:
•  the state system is fading in a territorially increasingly borderless world, but
•  secular enlightenment is challenged, by other world views now coming very 
close to the secular West given massive immigration.
Concretely, states — except the big ones beyond 100 million — are yielding in 
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salience to such actors as local authorities (LAs), nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), transnational corporations (TNCs), regions, and at 
the global level the UN.
And secular I-culture enlightenment is competing with religions, 
spirituality, and we-cultures. The idea of Western secularism becoming a 
universal world view, like in Matt. 28:18-20 is fading. Structures and cultures 
are dialectic; there are forces and counter-forces. Surprising only to linearists.
The Social Is Changing; so also the Human Rights?
We start with the hypothesis of the fading state system.
There are two major problems. First, do states really have the power, 
resources and legitimacy to implement human rights if they so want? And 
second, given the CP and ESC records of many states, particularly the bigger 
ones, is it obvious that they so want?  If incapable, or unwilling, or both, do 
some states still serve a useful purpose in the human rights construction?
Or, could other actors, like regions, be more useful, given the mobility 
and cultural shocks mentioned?  How about regions — European, African, 
South Asian, Southeast Asian, and the coming Latin American, Islamic, East 
Asian and possibly Russian?
Beyond that, could we possibly imagine another approach, in fact 
broadening all levels in the triadic construction?  
To start at the top: the UN has been very skilful in accommodating non-
state actors as carriers of world views “in consultative capacity”. Sooner or 
later a Security Council will reflect the regions, not like today giving the EU 
two vetoes and the others none. There are platforms for NGOs. The TNCs 
are brought in under the heading of social compacts (the LAs are absent, 
however). For a human rights council to consult with all of them, even 
bringing them in, should not be too complicated.
At the middle level: why not take the whole catalogue of rights and add 
non-state to state actors as duty-holders, adding not only regions but also 
NGOs-TNCs-LAs? Europe as a region is both norm-sender, duty-holder, 
sender of legitimacy and receiver of accountability. That formula could be 
generalized to other regions, some may be ready, some not, under the aegis of 
the UN.
At the bottom level: adding collective to individual rights-holders, to 
accommodate we-culture concerns.
These processes are evolving today, with the European region, the NGO 
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Amnesty International, and the social compact approach up front. The 
human rights discourse accommodates them all up to some point, which in 
itself is no small achievement.
But with structures changing, meanings of human rights will also change. 
Late 18th century human rights delivered a fragmented, individualized 
citizenry to the state, against payment in human rights currency, and with the 
right for the state to exact payback in obedience currency, ultimately their 
life, serving the wars promoted by the state. A good deal?
With duty-holders more dispersed the loyalty-subservience of the rights-
holders will not be the same. Loyalties, payback obligations, felt or real, will 
also be dispersed. From a world with a fragmented system of states with 
fragmented citizenries a more pluralistic human rights structure should 
promote a more complex web of rights and duties. More entropy, more peace.
Adding collective rights will increase this complexity. Take the three 
examples of possible “Asian” collective rights:
the recognition of villages, traditional crafts and clans as rights-holders 
brings rights- and duty-holders closer together. Potentially this should open 
for a linkage between the human rights tradition of entitlements, because it 
is a right, and the tradition of mutual rights and obligations often rooted in 
compassion. But here some care has to be exercised. A state, or a region, or 
others, may protect a threatened village or craft by making monetary or 
other resources available, but that in itself does not guarantee that individual 
rights, for instance to a livelihood, will be met. In other words, the logic is 
not that I- and we-cultures, one good, one bad, are opposed to each other, 
rather that they are complementary. We need both.
Compare the human rights tradition to a classical family, here a little 
idealized, but far from atypical. There are one or a few breadwinners, not 
necessarily male, who contribute more materially than they receive. There are 
those very young or very old who receive more than they contribute. The 
setting provides for continuous and contiguous satisfaction of many basic 
needs. There is a master of distribution, usually the mother-wife, apportioning 
to the family members according to need more than according to 
contribution. And all of this carried by a sense of family togetherness and 
family sharing.
The comment is, of course, that the internal we-culture of the family 
comes to nothing when no bread can be earned; then they need security nets 
internal and external to the family. But the basic point is that in a reasonably 
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typical family meeting the needs of all is internalized as a culture, and 
institutionalized in the structure. Not doing so will lead to bad internal 
feelings and negative sanctions. Members of a family generally want do to 
each other what they have to do.
And in that lies the crux of the matter. Let us say we are searching for a 
structure and culture of human rights so that rights are met because duty-
holders want to do what they have to do, must do. Or, do what they must do 
because they want do so, as the song goes, doing what comes naturally.
If conceived of as a part of the legal traditio the focus is on negative 
institutionalization, punishing the duty-holder for not exercising the duty, 
lamenting how this genius human rights bridge between domestic and 
international law falls short because it is not enforceable in an anarchic world. 
The legal tradition is punishment oriented; the socio-anthropological 
tradition is equally or more internalization oriented. 
Norms are rooted inside us, not only communicated from the outside as 
reward and punishment. But one condition for this to happen is that the 
norms, in casu the human rights norms — and that is the reason why from 
the beginning of this essay they have been referred to as norms, not as laws — 
are felt as a part of the culture dwelling inside us, not as a foreign implant 
imposed from the outside. If the deep culture is secular-individualist the 
human rights come as ripe fruits from that tree, just spelling out the obvious. 
Individual freedom of expression, for instance, comes as a basic right, as a 
part of the deeper individual self-realization. Unproblematic.
However, when the twin assumptions of secularism and individualism 
are not satisfied problems arise. Take the buddhist case. There is a deep 
spirituality seeing the web of relations between all sentient life, past-present-
future, as more real than the individual manifestations of life. This means that 
how one relates is more important than who one is. Relations matter more 
than attributes. “I relate, hence I am” overshadows the individualistic “I think, 
hence I am”, and even more so if those thoughts are supposed to be cartesian 
only.
In some buddhisms the ethical budget is collective: what my “I” has 
done of good comes to my near others as a merit because they inspired me. 
And conversely, whatever that “I” has done of bad comes to that “we” as a 
demerit because of acts of omission: they should have warned me, stood by 
me, helped me in that critical moment. My act of commission was contingent 
on their acts of omission.
The human rights implication is the right to relate. But in an atomizing 
postmodern social order with high loneliness that may be impossible. A 
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social crime; some kind of genocide.
The Case of Islam: A Note
Let us hold the islamic social — with abrahamic roots like judaism and 
christianity but with more distance to secularism and individualism — up 
against human rights. Togetherness in the divine, and social sharing, are 
essential constituents. There is that of the family, hence brothers, sisters, in the 
five pillars of islam. The shahada, the declaration of faith with the salat, prayer 
in a position of submission, islam, express togetherness. The zakat, sharing 
with the poor, and the ramadam, a month of fasting reminding the believers of 
what it means to have nothing to eat and drink, are social acts, not individual 
attributes. Beyond the right not to be hungry is the duty to share so that 
nobody is hungry.
Objection: meeting the right is an end that can be met by many means. 
However, if the means also become autotelic ends, then sharing, like 
togetherness, becomes a right, not only a duty, moving up in the means-ends 
hierarchy. To be enshrined.
Pillar No. 5, the hajj, pilgrimage to Mecca, is strong on both togetherness 
and sharing. A ritual; but the right to that practice is as essential as 
communion to a catholic. A human rights bill silent on such essentials is not 
compelling.
Tariq Ramadan (2010), in What I Believe, lists life, dignity, justice, 
equality, peace and nature as key islamic values. The right to life and dignity 
can perhaps be individualized, but the others are relational. The freedom to 
express the Danish Mohammed cartoons were in breach of the recipients’ 
right not to be insulted. Secularism-individualism is a stand alienating 
muslims4 and others. Changing human rights language so as to make muslims 
feel at home seems more adequate than demanding of muslims that they 
secularize, meaning that they give up islam.
The Right to Life - and to the Afterlife: A Note
The human rights tradition includes the right to life. It would have been 
4 Which means one out four humans, there being now 1,570 million muslims in the world 
(Stavanger Aftenblad, 2009/9/16).
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more credible had there been a right to live in a social and world order where 
everything is done to solve conflicts by peaceful means before they turn 
violent.
But the human rights tradition does not include the basic human concern 
of all times: our body has only a finite lease on life. Many are the formulas to 
extend that lease beyond the death of the body into an afterlife, like the 
christian promise of salvation for an eternal afterlife, on the condition of the 
right faith and-or deeds. The enlightenment spirit would, and should, 
certainly exclude any right to salvation as something beyond the capacity of 
any duty-holding state. But it is not beyond the capacity of a duty-holding state 
to make available concrete factors seen as necessary conditions for access to an 
afterlife to the believers, like the places of worship. confession etc. Referring to 
the November 25 2009 Swiss referendum on forbidding minarets the 
argument might be that these institutions should be visible, maybe also 
audible (the mosque muezzin, the church bells).  For the believer there is 
much at stake. Freedom of faith assumes freedom of practice.
If afterlife is seen in terms of progeny, then the rights of a clan as social 
actor enters. If afterlife is contingent on being member of a group with a 
collective ethical budget, then institutionalized isolation has to be avoided. All 
of this is within the capabilities of relevant duty-holders if they are not limited 
to states as organizations.
The enlightenment threw out the divine, and in that process also came 
close to negating the spiritual. But the spiritual has material foundations, and 
their protection is a human right.
Human Rights Meeting Social Science: A note
There is a huge problem here. I have built this essay around the idea that 
the human rights tradition was resting on two pillars, the state system and the 
enlightenment, both of them challenged by a vast array of interconnected 
processes we refer to as globalization. I have tried to make the point that 
human rights will have to change, at least bend; or else crack. They will not get 
out of this encounter untouched.
Others hailing from that vast intellectual continent social sciences, 
including law and history, may see this wholly or partly differently.
The problem with the social sciences is that they are also the children of 
the state system and the enlightenment. The unit they address, with the 
honorable exception of anthropology, is the country-state: sociology, 
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economics, political science (the German Staatswissenschaft), international 
studies, a misnomer for what is actually interstate studies. Rarely do they 
transgress borders. Comparative sociology is not the same as a sociology of 
the global social system. Nor do the many charts paralleling the historical 
diachronies of components of our human abode, the world, add up to world 
history. Law is “municipal” — a strange word for domestic — but is more 
global as international law even if much is tied to the state system. And 
psychology? Maybe the study of the misfits in that system?
“Social” means state, it seems. And “science” means empiricism, even 
behaviorism, depriving human beings of their inner essence, the spiritual 
ability not only to see themselves but to transcend what they see. Which they 
do again and again, but so much social science tries to freeze them in static, 
non-contradictory, laws called findings.
The unavoidable conclusion from this analysis is that the social sciences 
suffer from the same deficits as the human rights: They are all children of the 
same union of the structure of the state system with the culture of 
enlightenment. The problem is whether they are capable not only of 
suggesting remedies but even of analyzing deficits from which they themselves 
are suffering. An objection might be that if experienced as deficits they could 
be particularly capable.
However that may be, the peace research discourse is an effort to 
elaborate epistemologies capable of accommodating such problems. A key 
term is “trans”, like in transnational, translevel, and transdisciplinary5, go 
beyond; liberating the peace concept from any particular nation or civilization, 
from the state system, and from any particular social science. All cultures have 
something to contribute, all levels of human organization — micro-meso-
macro-mega — have their conflicts and patterns of cooperation, each social 
science has important insights to offer. Transdisciplinary foci, like 
conflictology and paxology, are efforts to bring such insights together.
However, there is a deeper level than “trans”, like an epistemology of 
dialectic holism. The world is, indeed, a holon, with countless forces and 
counterforces, contradictions, in other words dialectics. Nothing is 
permanent, including that rule.
Human rights as they emerged are not forever, nor is “the social”, any 
social, nor the sciences to come to grips with the social. Hence this essay, as an 
indication of where the current dialectics may take us. Yield or break, like the 
famous cherry tree branch overloaded with wet snow. Adapt or die. Better the 
5 See Galtung (2008), www.transcend.org/tup.
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former, particularly with something so valuable as human rights.
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